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Abstract
In 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board updated the way lease transactions are
reported. This paper offers insight into the financial reporting quality of the early adopters of
Accounting Standards Update on Leases, ASU 2016-02. Methodology modeled after an event
study on clawback provisions conducted by Dehaan, Hodge, and Shelvin (2013) aids in the
development of the hypothesis and matched-sample event study using restatements and audit
opinions as proxies for financial reporting quality. It is hypothesized that the early adopters of
ASU 2016-02 will have better financial reporting quality when compared to a control group.
Results do not support the hypothesis, so an additional analysis on the characteristics of the early
adopters is conducted showing poor financial performance potentially explained by the Big Bath
Theory.
Key words: lease, accounting standards update, financial reporting quality, financial
characteristics, early adoption
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Introduction
In 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the authority on setting
standards that appear in the FASB Accounting Standards Codification (“Accounting Standards
Updates Issued”, n.d.), reformed their reporting standards for leases (FASB, ASU 2016-02). For
public companies that file financial statements with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
these new standards must be adopted and integrated into their financial reports for fiscal years
beginning after December 15, 2018x.
The goal of this study is to gain insight into the financial reporting quality of the firms
that have chosen to early adopt Accounting Standards Update 2016-02 in hopes that it will
provide more information concerning the impact of the new standard to current accounting
practitioners. More specifically, this study will provide insight into the nature of firms that
choose to early adopt new accounting standards and the overarching factors affecting companies’
decision-making when acquiring an increase in liabilities, as will occur under the adoption of the
new leasing standard, or other standards updates that bring with them a perceivably negative
financial impact. Based on prior research conducted by Dehaan, Hodge, and Shelvin (2013), it is
hypothesized that firms that decide to early adopt an accounting standard update are often more
concerned with financial reporting quality. Financial reporting quality can serve as an indicator
of how ethical and financially transparent a firm is. By studying the relationship between the
financial reporting quality of early adopters of ASU 2016-02 and their decision to adopt the
update prior to the effective mandatory date, a better understanding of the situation

1 For other entities, the effective date is for fiscal years after December 15, 2019. There is one final effective date, December 15,
2020, for those companies using interim periods, or any period that is shorter than a fiscal year (FASB, ASU 2016-02). That
being said, companies are permitted to adopt the standards prior to the effective date.
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surrounding the new lease standard update is made. Findings show opposing results, so an
analysis on the characteristics of the early adopters is also conducted.
Review of Literature
Background Information on ASU 2016-02 (Topic 842, Leases)
In 1976, FASB released the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.
13, Accountingfor Leases in order to establish reporting standards for leases by both lessees and
lessors (“Summary of standard No. 13”, n.d.). Under SFAS No. 13, there are two categories
leases could be classified as - capital leases and operating leases. Capital leases occur when the
lessor finances the leased asset and all other rights of ownership transfer to the lessee. A capital
lease requires the recording of both an asset and a corresponding liability to the balance sheet. In
addition, any lease that meets one or more of the four tests described in SFAS No. 13 is
classified as a capital lease. These tests include a transfer of ownership at the end of the lease
term, a bargain purchase option given to the lessee, the lease term is seventy-five percent or
greater than the asset’s economic life, and finally a present value test where the present value of
the lease payment is at least ninety percent of the leased asset’s fair market value (FASB, p. 8,
1976). All other leases that do not meet those requirements are classified as operating leases.
Unlike capital leases, operating leases are handled as an operating expense (FASB,
1976). To further illustrate the differences between recording a capital lease and an operating
lease, a capital lease involves recording an asset and a liability. Along with recognizing the
liability, a company will also record interest expense, because the leased asset is considered a
loan. The company will also recognize depreciation expense, because the leased asset is included
on the balance sheet, and assets depreciate over time. With an operating lease, the lease expense
is recorded on the income statement. The lease expense is much smaller relative to the liability
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recognized under the capital lease. Because there is no liability recorded with an operating lease,
there is also no interest expense.
Under this method, companies are prone to evade the standards by utilizing loopholes to
report leases as operating leases rather than capital leases. For example, one of the determining
tests when looking at leases is the bright-line test. Under the old standards, to be classified as a
capital lease, the lease term will be seventy-five percent or greater than the asset’s economic life
and ninety percent of the fair value (FASB, p. 8, 1976). Companies, however, are able to
manipulate certain numbers like the economic life of an asset and the fair market value in order
to be able to report what should be considered a capital lease as an operating lease. By doing this,
companies can avoid reporting liabilities on their balance sheet through off-balance sheet
reporting. With operating leases, there is a lack of transparency in the company’s financial
statements that can occur. Companies are able to use off-balance sheet reporting to remove
certain unfavorable accounts in order to create better looking financial statements (FASB, ASU
2016-02). For example, in order to avoid acquiring more debt than a company already has
recorded, the company can use a subsidiary to purchase an asset and then lease it to the original
company with an operating lease. Now the company only has to record an operating expense and
does not have to record an additional liability or interest expense in their financial statements.
To improve the transparency, understandability, and decision-usefulness of financial
reporting on leasing, the FASB issued Accounting Standard Update 2016-02, Leases, to
supersede the standards set under SFAS No. FASB, ASU 2016-02). As explained previously, the
new standards have a mandatory effective date of December 15, 2018 for public companies. For
all other companies, there is a December 15, 2019 effective date and, for companies reporting on
interim periods, an effective date beginning after December 15, 2020. Early adoption of the new
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standards is permitted (FASB, ASU 2016-02). Under the new standards, there are also two
classifications of leases - finance leases, previously called capital leases, and operating leases.
Like SFAS No. 13, there are still tests in order to classify a lease as either a finance lease or an
operating lease. These tests share similarities with the previously used tests (FASB, ASU 201602). However, there is a striking difference between SFAS No. 13 and ASU 2016-02 in terms of
how leases are recorded.
Under SFAS No. 13, operating leases are not recorded on the balance sheet thus limiting
the amount of liabilities present. As explained in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, every lease
creates both a right-of-use asset and a corresponding liability (FASB, 1985). To absolve the
ability to circumvent the classification of leases like companies were able to under the previous
standards, firms are required to capitalize all leases with lease terms of twelve months or more
(FASB, ASU 2016-02). Companies that have historically avoided capitalizing their leases by
sidestepping the previously set standards will experience an increase in their liabilities as they
capitalize their leases.

Off-balance Sheet Transactions
To provide a better understanding of the effects of off-balance sheet reporting, several
brief examples will be discussed in the following section. Through the use of an off-balance
sheet account, the Lehman Brothers were able to move billions of dollars of debt off of their
balance sheet. This was done in an effort to appear more financially stable before the quarter’s
end. Once the end of the quarter had passed, the debt was brought back to the balance sheet.
Lehman Brothers could not sustain this and soon went bankrupt (Hines, Kreuze, & Langsam,
2011).
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In another infamous case of off-balance financing, Enron used special purpose vehicles to
hide the company’s debt. A special purpose vehicle owns an asset on behalf of a company and
leases the asset to the company. In this case, the company will incur an operating lease expense
off the balance sheet instead of a large liability from purchasing the asset outright. From there,
the company would only have to record the small lease payments as operating expenses
(Thomas, 2002). While these are dramatic scenarios of fraud and misrepresentation, efforts like
these will be much harder to successfully complete with the new lease standards since
companies’ ability to have lease transactions off of the balance sheet is hoped to have drastically
declined. To be clear, off-balance sheet items are not required to be reported on the balance
sheet. However, it mitigates the possibility of misrepresentation and poor financial reporting
quality if they are recorded on the balance sheet.
Hypothesis Development

Under ASU 16-02, the major change between the previous method of recording leases
and the new standards is how a company must record their operating leases. According to the
new standards, companies must capitalize operating leases that are longer than one year. As
previously explained, companies are given the opportunity to either early adopt the new
standards prior to the mandatory effective date or to wait until the mandatory date to begin
integrating the new standard into their financial reporting. The previous analysis of the
background of the new standard, ASU 16-02, gives the impression that financial statements are
“unfavorable” compared to previous years.
Dehaan, Hodge, and Shelvin (2013) examine the effects voluntary adoption of a
compensation clawback provision has on the improvement of financial reporting quality.
Clawback provisions permit companies to recuperate compensation from executives contingent
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upon a predefined event meaning after a financial restatement due to misconduct, companies are
required to attempt to repay any excess incentive compensation from CEOs and CFOs (DeHaan
et al., 2013, p. 2). DeHaan et. al find that companies that voluntarily adopted the clawback
provisions had an increase in financial reporting quality.
While Dehaan et al.’s major finding is that the companies that implement the clawback
provisions have an increase in financial reporting quality, they also find that the companies that
adopt the provision generally have better financial reporting quality prior to the implementation
of the clawback provision than companies that did not. Therefore, voluntary adopters tend to be
more ethical and transparent in their financial reporting. Rather than experiencing an increase in
financial reporting quality, when Dehaan et al.’s findings are applied to the situation created by
ASU 2016-02, companies that voluntarily adopt the standard early choose to adopt the new
changes prior to the mandatory effective date, because they have better financial reporting
quality.

Proxies
In Dehaan et al.’s research, they use several different proxies for financial reporting
quality including restatements. Restatements are often indicative of a company’s financial
reporting quality, because restatements often occur when there has been an accounting error,
clerical error, noncompliance with GAAP, or intentional fraud or misrepresentation. Companies
with more restatements are likely to have lower financial reporting quality, whereas companies
with less restatements are likely to have higher financial reporting quality.
In addition to using restatements, this study focuses on audit opinion as a proxy for
financial reporting quality. Auditors provide five levels of audit opinions when conducting an
audit on a company - unqualified, unqualified with explanatory paragraphs, qualified, adverse,
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and no opinion. Unqualified opinions are given to companies when their financial statements are
free from material error or misstatements. Unqualified with explanatory paragraphs are given to
companies when their financial statements are free of material error or misstatements but there is
still a reason to explain a situation in more detail. Qualified are given to companies where there
is a material error or misstatement due to a limitation of scope in the auditor’s work or a lack of
maintaining GAAP principles. With a qualified opinion, the error or misstatement must be
material in nature. Lastly, when a company is given an adverse opinion or no opinion at all, there
is a material issue that is pervasive enough to misrepresent the company’s financial standing. No
opinion given often means that after conducting preliminary risk evaluations, the auditor
determined that the company was too risky to take on as a client.
Hypothesis
Based on previous, the following hypothesis has been developed:
HI: Voluntary adopters ofASU 2016-02 are more ethical companies with betterfinancial
reporting quality.
Financial reporting quality is measured using the similar proxies to the ones Dehaan, Hodge, and
Shelvin have utilized in their research on clawback provisions. Due to the findings of Dehaan et
al., I hypothesize that voluntary adopters are more concerned with being ethical and providing
transparent, decision-useful financial statements to their financial statement users. In this study,
“ethical” is defined as having better financial reporting quality. Therefore,
HIa: Voluntary early adopters ofASU 2016-02 will havefewer non-unqualified audit opinions
than their nonadopting peers.
Hlb: Voluntary adopters ofASU 2016-02 will havefewer restatements offinancial statements
than their nonadoptingpeers.
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Methodology
In order to test these hypotheses, I use an event study following similar procedures to
DeHaan’s research along with other event-focused studies. The event study consists of a
matched-sample comparative analysis relating the financial reporting quality of the early
adopters of ASU 2016-02 to a group of nonadopters. The use of a matched-sample design
controls for specific extraneous variables outside of the variables of interest. Variables that were
controlled in this study include firm size and firm industry. The matched-sample design consists
of a test group and a control group. Based on the data provided by CompuStaf s database, there
are eleven companies (Fig. 1) that have chosen to voluntarily early adopt ASU 2016-02. The
control group consists of eleven firms of similar size and industry (Fig. 2).
The first comparative analysis consists of conducting a paired t-test to test the
significance of the difference between the number of non-unqualified audit opinions for the early
adopters and their matched firms. As explained previously, there are five different opinions that
an auditor may deliver to a company. In this study, audit opinions are separated into unqualified
and non-unqualified opinions. Unqualified opinions indicate better financial reporting quality
than non-unqualified opinions.
The second comparative analysis consists of conducting another paired t-test to test the
significance of the difference between the number of restatements for the early adopters and their
matched firms. A higher number of restatements indicates a lower financial reporting quality.
Sample Firm Selection.
As briefly explained previously, the test group of companies consists of the companies
that have voluntarily adopted ASU 2016-02 prior to the effective date. The early adopters are
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collected by filtering the financial statement data in CompuStat with “ASU 2016-02” and the
year of adoption.

Early Adopters of ASU 2016-02
Adopters
EnSync
Rangeford
Resources
Great Elm Capital
Group
New Age
Beverage
New Peoples
Bankshares
Research
Solutions
William Lyon
Homes
YayYo
National Storage
Affiliates Trust
NextEra Energy
Partners
Schlumbereer

Adoption Year
2016

Total Assets
(000,000)
34,272

Mining
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate

2016

0

2017

76,694

Manufacturing

2017

67,672

Finance, Insurance k Real
Estate

2017

666.7

Services

2017

12 562

Construction
Services
Finance, Insurance k Real
Estate
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate
Mining

2017
2017

2061.104
0.322

2018

2729.263

2018
2018

9405
70507

Industry

Manufacturing

Figure 1. Company Information for Year of Adoption
The test group is then matched to a control firm of similar size and industry. In this study,
similar size of a company is determined by the Total Assets a company reports on their balance
sheet in the same year that the test firm adopted the new standard. For example, if Firm A has
10,000 dollars in Total Assets the year it adopted ASU 2016-02, Firm A is matched to a non¬
adopting firm in the same industry and year with a firm that has the closest amount in Total
Assets. Similar industry is determined by matching the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
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code for each firm in the test group to a firm of similar size and a similar SIC code. SIC codes
are strands of four digits describing the industry that a firm is in where each digit identifies
companies and their specific industry to a varying level of specificity. The first two digits of an
SIC code indicates the major industry group; this is the broadest classification. An additional
digit indicates the industry group, and the last digit identifies the specific industry (NAICS,
2018). While the SIC codes have not been updated since 1987 when they were replaced by the
North American Industrial Classification System codes, the SIC codes are still consistently used
by the SEC, private data sources, and academic researchers more frequently than the NAICS
codes are being used (“SIC Codes vs. NAICS Codes”, n.d.). Therefore, in a matched-sample
design, it is advantageous to be able to match the SIC code of the firm in the test group to a firm
with the exact same SIC code; however, in order to control for the size of the firm, in some cases
it is necessary to choose firms that only match the first three digits, meaning the firms are of
similar size in the same industry group, or in some situations only the first two digits, meaning
that the firms are of similar size in the same major industry group. In this particular study, fourdigit matches based on the test firm’s adoption year of ASU 2016-02 and their total assets are
difficult to make for a majority of the test group. In order to remain consistent throughout the
data collection process, firms are matched on a two-digit SIC code. The industry match is more
lenient in order to achieve a better match on firm size.
The following figure (Fig.2) displays the matched firms with the major industry group the
firm operates in, the year from which the data was selected, and the total reported assets of the
firm for that year.
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Non-Adopters of ASU 2016-02 (Matched Firms)
Adopters
Espey
Manufacturing &
Electronics
Tiger Oil and
Energy
Reven Housing
REIT
Planet Green
Holdings
Community
Bancorp/VT
Zedge
Beazer Homes
USA
My Size
Roved Gold Inc
EQT Midstream
Partners
Conocophillips

Data Year

Total Assets
(000,000)

Manufacturing

2016

34.453

Mining
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate

2016

0

2017

65.587

Manufacturing
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate
Services

2017

68.488

2017
2017

667.046
12.531

Construction
Services
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate
Finance, Insurance & Real
Estate
Mining

2017
2017

2220.995
2.418

201S

2682.016

2018
2018

9456.121
69980

Industry

Figure 2. Matched Firm Information for Year of Adoption
Results
Audit Opinion

Panel A: Total Number of Non-Unqualified Audit Opinion
Non-Adopter

Adopter
Rangeford Resources

3

Tiger Oil and Energy

3

Espey Manufacturing &
EnSync

1

Electronics

0

William Lyon Homes

0

Beazer Homes USA

0
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New Age Beverages

1

Planet Green Holdings

3

New Peoples Bankshares

0

Community Bancorp/VT

0

Great Elm Capital Group

3

Reven Housing REIT

0

YayYo

1

My Size

0

Schlumberger

0

Conocophillips

0

NextEra Energy Partners

3

EQT Midstream Partners

0

Trust

0

Royal Gold Inc

0

Research Solutions

0

Zedge

0

National Storage Affiliates

Panel B: Paired t tests (Difference: Adopter - Non-Adopter)
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

t Value

Pr > |t|

47 *

0.1277

0.4480

1.95

0.0569

Figure 3. Analysis of Financial Reporting Quality - Audit Opinion (2014-2018)
Analysis of Audit Opinion.
Based on the results shown in the figure above (Figure 3), the hypothesis cannot be
supported at a 95% confidence level. Based on the mean difference, the hypothesis is not
supported. In this case, the mean difference is the average difference between the number of nonunqualified audit opinions for the early adopters and the number of non-unqualified audit

* In theory, this number should be fifty-five, because the analysis is over the five-year period, 2014 to 2018. All
eleven firms, however did not have financial data for all five years. For example, YayYo, Inc. only has one year
(2017) of financial data reported. For this reason, the sample is forty-seven.
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opinions for the non-adopters. The mean difference in this scenario is 0.1277, meaning that on
average the difference between the average number of non-unqualified audit opinions is higher
for the test group than their matched controls. Based on the framework research performed by
Dehaan, et al., the early adopters are expected to have fewer non-unqualified audit opinions
indicating that the test firms are more ethical and have better financial reporting quality. Because
the mean difference for non-unqualified audit opinions is positive, it cannot be concluded that
the early adopters have better financial reporting quality. Although it is improper practice to
assume the alternative hypothesis when rejecting the null, the results of the t-test providing a pvalue of 0.0569 indicate that the alternative hypothesis can be marginally supported at the 90%
confidence level.
Number of Restatements
Panel A: Total Number of Restatement
Adopter
Rangeford Resources

Non-Adopter
2

Tiger Oil and Energy

0

Espey Manufacturing &
EnSync

0

Electronics

0

William Lyon Homes

0

Beazer Homes USA

0

New Age Beverages

1

Planet Green Holdings

1

New Peoples Bankshares

1

Community Bancorp/VT

0

Great Elm Capital Group

0

Reven Housing REIT

1

YayYo

0

My Size

0

Schlumberger

0

Conocophillips

0

NextEra Energy Partners

1

EQT Midstream Partners

1
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National Storage Affiliates
Trust

0

Royal Gold Inc

1

Research Solutions

0

Zedge

1

Panel B: Paired t tests (Difference: Adopter - Non-Adopter)
N
**

47

Mean

Std. Dev.

t Value

Pr > |t|

-0.0213

0.4418

-0.33

0.7428

Figure 4. Analysis of Financial Reporting Quality - Restatement (2014-2018)
Analysis of Restatements.
The results of the paired t-test comparing the number of restatements for the early
adopters and non-adopters also provide results that do not support the hypothesis that the
financial reporting quality of the early adopters is better than the financial reporting quality of
the control group. Based on the results of the t-test and the calculated p-value, the hypothesis
cannot be supported at a 95% significance level. There is no significant difference between the
number of restatements performed by the early adopters and the non-adopters. For this reason,
the hypothesis cannot be accepted, but may indicate that the early adopters are not as concerned
with financial reporting quality.
Discussion
Given that the data analysis provides results that do not support the hypotheses in
question, an analysis on the characteristics of the early adopters provides more insight into the
** In theory, this number should be fifty-five, because the analysis is over the five-year period, 2014 to 2018. All
eleven firms, however, did not have financial data for all five years. For example, YayYo, Inc. only has one year
(2017) of financial data reported. For this reason, the sample is forty-seven.
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lack of supporting results. In this analysis, I look at the test firms’ basic performance including
Net Income and Total Equity.
Analysis of Firm Performance
Year of Adoption.
Financial Characteristics of Early Adopters of ASU 2016-02
Year of Adoption (millions)
Firm
Adoption Year Net Income Total Equity
EnSync
2016
-17.876
16.636
Rangeford
Resources
2016
-1.254
-2.339
Great Elm
Capital Group
2017
-15.207
66.226
New Age
Beverage
2017
-3.536
52.738
New Peoples
2017
Bankshares
3.094
50.973
Research
2017
Solutions
-2.294
4.345
William Lyons
780.472
2017
48.135
Homes
-0.174
2017
-6.569
YayYo
National Storage
744.339
2018
14.109
Affiliates Trust
NextEra Energy
Partners
1798
192
2018
Schlumberger
2138
36162
2018

Figure 5. Financial Characteristics of Early Adopters for the Year of Adoption
When looking at the Net Income and Total Equity of the test firms from the year of
adoption displayed in Figure 5, a majority of the firms have poor performing numbers. Six of the
eleven test firms reported a negative Net Income for the year ASU 2016-02 was adopted. This
means that a majority of the test firms for the year of adoption have incurred more expenses than
revenues and are not making a profit. In addition to negative Net Income, several firms have
negative Total Equity. Negative stockholders’ equity is a red flag to investors, because it
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indicates that the company has more liabilities than they have assets. If the company were to sell
all of their assets today, there would be no money left for the stockholders.
In addition to the companies’ Net Income and Total Equity being unfavorable for the year
of adoption, a large percentage of the companies either have not reported their retained earnings
on their balance sheet or have reported negative retained earnings. For example, of the
companies that reported their retained earnings for the year of adoption, sixty percent had
significantly negative values ranging from negative six million dollars to approximately negative
eighteen million dollars. When recording negative retained earnings, the item on the balance
sheet is often referred to as “Accumulated Loss”. This accumulated loss is often another red flag
to investors, because it indicates that the company has not been able to maintain a profit and may
indicate serious financial problems (Jordan, et al., 2011).
2014-2018 Average.
Average Financial Characteristics of Early Adopters of ASU
2016-02 from 2014-2018 (millions)
Firm
Years
Net Income Total Equity
EnSync
2014-2018
-11.3354
12.877
Rangeford
-1.87
Resources
2014-2016
-1.59533333
Great Elm
Capital Group
2014-2018
-11.6356
50.7972
New Age
Beverage
2014-2017
-2.06825
14.5275
New Peoples
Bankshares
2014-2017
1.7385
46.707
Research
Solutions
2014-2018
-1.1126
2.8678
William Lyons
2014-2018
60.2776
Homes
708.578
YayYo
2017
-6.569
-0.174
National Storage
Affiliates Trust
2014-2018
9.495
445.3194
NextEra Energy
2014-2018
45
Partners
1332.2
Schlumberger
2014-2018
1291.2
37513
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Figure 6. Financial Characteristics of Early Adopters from 2014 to 2018
Figure 6 displays the test firms’ Net Income and Total Equity averaged from the years
2014 to 2018. When looking at the average Net Income and average Total Equity of the test
firms from these years, a majority of the firms still have poor performing numbers; six of the
eleven test firms reported a negative Net Income. In addition to negative Net Income, several
firms have negative Total Equity.
Relevant Theories & Potential Correlations
Related Studies.
While prior literature alludes to the idea that early adopters of accounting standards tend
to have better financial reporting quality (DeHaan, et al., 2013), the results presented in this
study do not support that idea.
In terms of potential reasons why the test firms appear to be underperforming, there are
several theories. In a study conducted by Ayres, the characteristics of firms electing to early
adopt a new standard for accounting for foreign currency conversion, SFAS 52, were analyzed in
order to gain insight into the positive theory of accounting choice. In Ayres’ study, it was found
that typically the firms that elected to early adopt the new standard tended to be smaller in size
than nonadopters and had less favorable financial ratios compared to nonadopters (Ayres, 1986).
Similar studies have been conducted. For example, in 1989, Trombley conducted a study
that shows that most of the early adopters of SFAS 86, a standard concerned with computer
software costs, were smaller in size than nonadopters much like the firms that chose to early
adopt the standard from the previous example in Ayres’ study (Trombley, 1989).
Big Bath Hypothesis.
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Another theory for the negative nature of the adopting firms’ financial performance could
be explained by the Big Bath hypothesis. In 1973, Moore discussed the theory of the “Big Bath”
concerning management changes and their relationship with discretionary accounting decisions.
In this study, Moore explains that there are several reasons a company will decide to adopt
discretionary accounting changes to include smoothing periodic income, creating ad hoc
fluctuations in income, and maximizing or minimizing reported income (Moore, 1973, p. 100).
This study performed by Moore specifically looked at the relationship between new management
and the adoption of discretionary accounting changes. Even though the study detailed in this
paper did not include the factor of new management’s decisions, the overall theory can still be
applied to the decision to adopt ASU 2016-02. Under the Big Bath hypothesis, management will
take a negative outlook on how they value certain assets in order to increase the perception of the
company in future years to appear as better performing. For example, a company will accumulate
a one-time charge against its income in order to decrease the company’s assets. By reducing its
assets, in turn, the company has reduced its expenses for future periods. While the reduction of
assets in the year of the bath results in a lower net income for that specific year, future years will
have lower expenses thus increasing the company’s income for following periods.
In general, the Big Bath hypothesis is applied to earnings management scenarios and
asset valuation. In this study, while the new leasing standard creates more leased assets due to
the capitalization of operating leases of one year or longer, the concept of asset valuation and
earnings management are not necessarily at play in this situation. However, the Big Bath can be
applied. With the adoption of new leasing standards, companies incur an increase in liabilities.
Generally, companies try to avoid liabilities and debt for various reasons. Because many
investors and financial analysts depend on companies’ financial statements in order to make
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decisions, it would be advantageous for the company to create a big bath now while they are
struggling, so that when and if they recuperate, the improvement is even more impressive than it
would have been to investors, lenders, and other financial statement users.
Self-Selection Bias.
Lastly, a potential theory regarding the lack of conclusive evidence pertaining to the
causal relationship between the financial reporting quality of the early adopters and their
decision to voluntarily adopt the new lease standards can be attributed to self-selection bias. Due
to the nature of the event, companies can select to adopt the new standards early or wait until the
effective date. Because of this, companies can unknowingly group themselves into biased
groups. Shehata (p. 768, 1991) explains that “self-selection bias arises from the use of truncated,
nonrandom sample to assess the behavior of firms using different accounting methods at the time
of the mandated change.” With the small sample of firms that elected to early adopt the new
standards, there is question as to whether or not the are random or nonrandom. With such a
small, potentially nonrandom sample, supporting results are difficult to make and, therefore,
conclusions and implications of the study are lacking as well.
Conclusion
Implications of Study
The goal of this study is to provide insight into the relationship between the decision to
early adopt ASU 2016-02 and the company’s financial reporting quality to accounting
practitioners. Given the results, a general conclusion concerning the causation between of the
financial reporting quality on the decision to early adopt ASU 2016-02 cannot be made. It is
hypothesized that firms that choose to adopt the new lease standard prior to the mandatory
effective date are more ethical, financially transparent firms. This is tested by looking at the

FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY OF ADOPTERS OF ASU 2016-02

20

financial reporting quality of the companies that decide to early adopt the standard compared to
those that choose to wait until the standards update becomes effective. Upon conducting a
matched-sample comparative analysis, it is found that the results of the paired t-test do not
support the null hypothesis. For this reason, an analysis on the characteristics of the test firms is
conducted. Based on the analysis, the firms appear to be poor performing firms. As discussed
earlier, this can be explained by several potential theories, specifically the Big Bath Theory.
Areas for Future Research
Due to the opposing results of the study, it is difficult to take any implications away from
this study. However, it does provide room for future areas of research. While this study looks at
the financial reporting quality of the early adopters compared to non-adopters of ASU 2016-02,
future research can examine the relationship between adopters and non-adopters in more detail,
perhaps looking more closely at the performance of the industries as a whole rather than just a
matched sample. For example, four out of eleven of the early adopters are in the major industry
group called “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate”. A future study concerning the characteristics
of that specific industry may bring to light certain things that may be indicative of what type of
firm chooses to voluntarily adopt an accounting standard update. Questioning why so many of
the early adopters are from one or two major industry groups could be indicative of the
performance of that industry as a whole, rather than the firms specifically.
Beyond examining the financial reporting quality of the early adopters, research
concerning the motivations of the companies should be assessed in more detail. Although this
study discusses the relationship to a certain extent, a more in-depth study focusing on applying
the Big Bath Theory to the firms’ financial characteristics may provide more insight into the
motivations behind the companies’ decisions to adopt the standards update prior to the
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mandatory effective date. A continuation from this study would provide insight into the
effectiveness of the company’s Big Bath decisions. Analyzing the financial standing, financial
ratios, and analyst forecasts of the early adopters may provide more understanding into the
application of the Big Bath Theory beyond earnings management. Often the Big Bath Theory is
applied strictly to earnings management scenarios. If a study analyzing the performance of the
early adopters of ASU 2016-02 is performed over the next few years, it could potentially better
link the theory to other areas of accounting theory.
Lastly, a comprehensive analysis on the effect of the new lease standards on companies’
financial statements would offer accounting practitioners better understanding of the update.
There has been some research conducted by large accounting firms showcasing how the lease
standards practically affect the financial statements of firms once they finally adopt. However,
considering the argument of whether or not the market is efficient, it would be interesting to see
if the market is efficient enough to respond to the new information and adjust accordingly.
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